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URKEY applied for associate membership in the EU – then the EEC – as
early as 1959. The application resulted in an Association Agreement
in 1963, whereby Turkey and the EU would conditionally and gradually create
a customs union by 1995 at the latest. The customs union was seen as a step
towards full membership at an unspecified future date. The EU unilaterally granted
Turkey preferential tariffs and financial assistance, but the process of staged,
mutual reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers was delayed in the 1970s
because of economic and political conditions in Turkey. Turkey applied for
full membership in 1987. The response in 1990 was that accession negotiations
could not be undertaken at the time, since the EU was engaged in major internal
changes as well as in the transition of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
However, the EU was prepared to extend economic relations without explicitly
rejecting the possibility of full membership at a future date. Hence, the plans for
a customs union were revived and a customs union for industrial goods was
phased in between 1996 and 2001.
The process of bringing the Central and Eastern European Countries – the
CEECs – into the EU made it difficult to keep the Turkish application for
membership on hold any longer. A breakthrough came at the Helsinki meeting
of the European Council in 1999, when Turkey attained status as a candidate for
membership. It now has a so-called Accession Partnership with the EU, which
means that the EU is working together with Turkey to enable it to adopt the
acquis communautaire, the legal framework of the EU. However, in contrast to
other candidate countries, Turkey has not received a timetable for accession. The
revision of the number of votes and their distribution in the Council of Ministers
that was agreed on during the Nice summit in 2000 did not take Turkish member-
ship into account, which effectively meant that the EU-15 did not think that
Turkey would become a member during the coming twelve years.
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and contributions of Harry Flam. However, the
views expressed in this paper are the author’s sole responsibility.
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The purpose of this paper is to study selected aspects of Turkish accession.
While Section 2 discusses briefly the trade aspects of Turkey–EU relations,
Section 3 considers the effects of Turkish accession on Turkey, and Section 4
the effects of Turkish accession on the EU. Finally, Section 5 spells out the
conclusions.
2. OPENING UP THE TURKISH ECONOMY
Until the early 1980s Turkey was a fairly closed economy. At that time – as
part of more wide ranging economic reforms – the trade policy of protection and
import substitution was replaced by a much more open trade regime. Measured
as the average of exports and imports of goods and services over GDP, the
openness ratio in 1980 was 9 per cent. Since then, trade has expanded rapidly and
by 2000 the openness ratio was 27.9 per cent. Turkey joined the European customs
union (CU) starting 1 January, 1996. According to the Customs Union Decision
(CUD) all industrial goods except the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’
(ECSC) products circulate duty free between the parties as of 1 January, 1996. In
the case of ECSC products, Turkey has signed a ‘Free Trade Agreement’ (FTA)
with the EU in July 1996 as a result of which ECSC products received duty-free
treatment between the parties since 1999. Currently, no quotas and tariffs are
imposed on imports of industrial goods. Turkey is implementing the Commun-
ity’s Common Customs Tariff on imports of industrial goods from third countries.
On the commercial policy side Turkey has adopted the EC competition law,
established the Competition Board, adopted the EC rules on protection of intel-
lectual and industrial property rights, established the Patent Office, and started to
harmonise technical legislation concerning industrial products and establishment
of a sound conformity assessment and market surveillance structures internally.
Consideration of Turkish merchandise trade data for the year 2000 reveals that
Turkish merchandise exports amounted to US$27.3 billion and merchandise
imports to US$54 billion. Exports to the EU-15 formed 52.5 per cent of total
exports, and imports from the EU 48.9 per cent of total imports. Among the EU-
15, Germany is Turkey’s most important trade partner with export and import
shares of 18.8 and 13.2 per cent respectively.
Turkey’s pattern of trade in goods is shown in Figure 1. For a country in the
middle income range, the pattern is fairly sophisticated; almost 90 per cent of
trade is in manufactures. However, when one scrutinises the trade pattern in
manufactures, it becomes clear that manufacturing exports are concentrated in
low skilled, low wage goods such as textiles and clothing, while manufacturing
imports are concentrated in skill- and capital-intensive goods, such as machinery,
telecommunications equipment and automotive products. However, during the
last decade, exports of machinery and automotive products have grown much
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FIGURE 1
Turkey-EU Trade, 2000 (US$ billion)
more rapidly than exports of textiles and clothing, while the reverse can be seen
for imports. Much the same can be said for the trade pattern with the EU, although
here trade in manufactures dominates even more. Thus, the comparative advant-
age of Turkey lies in agricultural goods, primarily fruits and vegetables, iron,
steel, textiles and clothing, that is, in resource and labour-intensive goods, while
Turkey’s comparative disadvantage lies in physical and human capital-intensive
goods, as revealed by large net imports of more sophisticated manufactures.
The deficit in goods trade is substantial, at US$26.7 billion in total and about
US$12.1 billion with the EU. However, the statistics quoted above do not include
the considerable transit and shuttle trade. Shuttle trade includes the trade carried
out by people from parts of the former Soviet Union, who travel to Turkey to fill
large suitcases with various goods to bring back to their home countries. The
transit and shuttle trade provides 3–4 billion euros in net exports. The deficit in
goods trade is also balanced by a surplus in tourism services. In fact, tourism is
the single largest export item, with export revenues of about 7 billion euros.
The Turkish tariff rates applicable on imports of industrial commodities from
the EU are all zero as shown in Figure 2. The average tariff rate on imports of
agricultural commodities from the EU is 11.1 per cent. Since Turkey has signed
free trade agreements (FTAs) with EFTA countries, Israel, and with most of the
CEECs which have FTAs with the EU, the applied Turkish tariff rates applicable
on imports of industrial goods from these countries are also zero. Furthermore,
since Turkey has adopted the Community’s common customs tariffs on imports
of industrial goods from third countries, the Turkish applied tariff rates on indus-
trial goods from third countries equal those of the EU. While the average tariff
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1 Sectoral tariff rates have been obtained by weighting the line tariff rates by Turkish imports of
the commodity in the sector.
2 For a discussion of issues related with contingent protectionism and technical barriers to trade see
Togan et al. (2003a).
FIGURE 2
Tariff Rates on Imports from EU and Third Countries
rate on imports of iron and steel products from third countries equals 18.3 per
cent, the average tariff rate on agricultural commodities on imports from third
countries equals 13.9 per cent and on textile and clothing products 7.7 per cent.1
Regarding market access for Turkish exports into the EU market, we note that
the EU abolished the nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods from
Turkey on 1 September, 1971. However, certain exceptions for textile products
were made. Furthermore, trade of products within the province of the ECSC were
protected by the Community through the application of non-tariff barriers and
anti-dumping measures. These barriers to trade have been eliminated to a large
extent with the formation of the customs union in 1995.2
3. EFFECTS OF ACCESSION ON TURKEY
Joining the EU will require Turkey to adopt and implement the entire body of
EU legislation. This means that Turkey should attain macroeconomic stability,
adopt the CAP, liberalise its services and network industries and bring among
others its environmental protection system and standards up to Western European
levels.
a. Macroeconomic Stability
Table 1 shows the EMU convergence criteria for Turkey and the CEEC.
The table reveals that the CEEC are about to satisfy the criteria, but that Turkey
































Budget Deficit Government Interest Exchange Rate Currency Regime
Inflation Rate Per Cent Debt Per Rates 10Y Stability Deviation
Per Cent of GDP Cent of GDP Bonds from Parity
2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 Last Last Max (2Y)
Bulgaria 10.1 7.9 −1.1 −1.0 83.8 72.5 5.2 0.0 −1.3 Currency Board (EUR)
Czech Republic 3.9 4.7 −4.0 −3.2 29.2 29.0 5.5 14.0 −6.0 Managed Float (EUR reference)
Estonia 4.0 5.8 −0.7 1.1 6.6 6.2 4.7 0.0 0.0 Currency Board (EUR)
Hungary 9.8 9.2 −3.5 −5.0 56.1 51.5 6.7 5.4 −4.5 Crawling Peg (EUR)
Latvia 2.7 2.5 −2.8 −1.9 10.0 12.2 10.7 2.6 2.6 Peg (SDR)
Lithuania 1.0 1.3 −2.8 −1.4 28.3 29.0 7.9 8.1 8.1 Currency Board (EUR)
Poland 10.1 5.5 −2.7 −6.3 43.8 38.0 8.3 8.4 −8.7 Float
Romania 45.7 34.5 −4.1 −3.7 29.2 31.2 34.9 −31.4 −31.5 Managed Float (USD reference)
Slovakia 12.0 7.3 −6.8 −7.2 32.9 42.7 7.8 4.0 −2.0 Managed Float (EUR reference)
Slovenia 8.9 8.5 −1.4 −1.3 25.1 25.4 na −7.1 −7.1 Managed Float (EUR reference)
Turkey 54.9 54.4 −19.6 −17.6 57.4 93.3 75.0 56.9 93.3 Float
Reference Value 2.8 3.3 −3.0 −3.0 60.0 60.0 7.3 +/− 15%
Notes:
Parity refers to last three-year average exchange rate against EUR. In the case of Turkey the interest rate is the annual compound interest rate on government bonds of
eight months’ duration obtained in the latest auction of treasury bills.
Source: Deutsche Bank Research, EU Enlargement Monitor (April 2002), Turkish State Planning Organisation, Central Bank of Turkey and Turkish Treasury (2002).
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determined campaign to turn around decades of weak performance reflected by
pervasive structural rigidities, and weak public finances. The past few years have
witnessed three major attempts at addressing underlying weaknesses. The first
was during 2000 under the three-year Standby Agreement initiated in December
1999. Despite some notable achievements, a worsening current account and a
fragile banking system led in late 2000 to a liquidity crisis which turned into a
full-blown crisis in February 2001. The government decided to abandon the
crawling peg regime and floated the currency. In May 2001 the IMF increased its
assistance under a new stand-by arrangement. Just as the revised programme was
beginning to show results, the events of 11 September triggered the re-emergence
of serious financing problems. In February 2002 the IMF approved a new three-
year stand-by credit for Turkey to support the government’s economic programme.
With the implementation of the stabilisation programme Turkey envisages a gradual
but steady improvement in its economic conditions.
Turkey realises that soon after accession it will be expected to join the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-II) for at least two years and to achieve
the Maastricht conditions for monetary and fiscal convergence before its EMU
membership is examined.3 Once admitted Turkey would then replace its domestic
currency with the euro at an irrevocably fixed exchange rate, confer the bulk of
its reserves to the European Central Bank, and be bound by the so-called ‘growth
and stability pact’.
For Turkey the problem is not how to stay out of EMU but, on the contrary,
how to reap the net benefits expected of monetary integration by fulfilling the
Maastricht criteria as soon as possible. But these benefits can only be derived at
some cost. The costs of fulfilling the Maastricht criteria when estimated by expected
output losses turn out to be quite considerable.4
b. Agriculture5
Agriculture is an important part of the Turkish economy. Turkish agriculture
contributes about 14 per cent to GDP and provides 33 per cent of total employment.
The corresponding figures for the EU-15 are 1.7 and 4.3 per cent. In absolute
3 The conditions require that (i) member country’s inflation may not exceed the average of the
three lowest inflation rates in the EMS by more than 1.5 per cent, (ii) its long-term interest rate
must not exceed the average of the interest rates in the three countries with the lowest inflation rates
by more than 2 per cent, (iii) its exchange rate must have been in the ‘normal’ band of the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) without devaluation for at least two years, (iv) its public debt
cannot exceed 60 per cent of its GDP, and (v) budget deficit must not exceed 3 per cent of its GDP.
4 The expected output losses can be determined with the use of a ‘sacrifice ratio’ defined as the
cumulative loss in output, measured as a per cent of GNP, associated with a one percentage point
permanent reduction in inflation. On the sacrifice ratio see, for example, Ball (1993).
5 These results were obtained in collaboration with Harry Flam.
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numbers, Turkey employs about the same number of people in agriculture as the
EU-15, or more than 7 million. In terms of agricultural land, adding Turkey to
the EU would increase the area under cultivation by 32 per cent. Adding both
CEEC-10 and Turkey increases EU land under cultivation by about 78 per cent.
Trade in agricultural products between the EU and Turkey is a relatively small
part of their total trade. Most of this consists of exports of fresh and processed
fruits and vegetables. Agricultural trade is not part of the EU–Turkish customs
union, is subject to duties, quotas and price regulations, and it is highly protected.
Turkey has granted very few preferential tariffs on agricultural imports from the
EU. High specific duties are applied to core products of the CAP: cereals and
processed cereals, sugar and sugar products, dairy products and meat. Also, olive
oil is highly protected. Turkish exports of vegetables and fruits receive export
subsidies. The EU has, on the other hand, granted imports from Turkey highly
preferential treatment. Many agricultural imports enter the EU without duties.
Import barriers exist mostly in the form of tariff-quota schemes, where imports
within the quota are free from tariffs and the entry price scheme, where specific
duties are applied as long as the value of the consignment falls below the entry
price. It is estimated that about 70 per cent of imports from Turkey enter the EU
duty free and without any other import barriers.
In Turkey agricultural support has until now placed a large burden on taxpayers.
Transfers to farmers have amounted to about five per cent of GDP and the total
support to agriculture, including the higher prices paid by consumers, has been
estimated at eight per cent of GDP. These numbers tell us that Turkish accession
is likely to have important social, distributional and political effects in Turkey.
The reason is that Turkey would have to switch policies to the CAP – something
it is already in the process of doing – and would also be eligible for CAP
financial support.
In the EU, prices of many agricultural products have been kept above world
market prices by the buying up of excess supplies at administratively determined
minimum prices and by protecting EU markets from low world market prices by
duties on imports. Excess supplies were disposed of at a loss in the EU and on
the world market. Starting in 1993, the CAP has gradually been shifting away
from price to income support. Currently, prices in the EU are lowered towards
world market prices and farmers are compensated by direct income payments
based on their holdings of land and animals. The CAP favours the main agricul-
tural products and farmers of the original EU-6, namely grains, sugar beets, dairy
products and beef. Fruits, vegetables, poultry and pork, important products of
the newer, southern members, receive less or no support. Recently, the EU has
declared that farmers from CEECs will not be excluded from direct income
support payments, but stated that direct payments would be introduced in CEECs
equivalent to 25 per cent in 2004, 30 per cent in 2005 and 35 per cent in 2006 of
the present system. After 2006 direct payments would be increased by percentage
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steps in such a way as to ensure that the new member states reach in 2013 the
support level then applicable. Since by 2013 support could absorb a high percent-
age of the EU budget it seems that the support system of the EU will change to
a large extent between now and then.
In Turkey the most important part of agricultural policy has been price sup-
port. State economic enterprises and agricultural sales cooperatives have been
commissioned to buy cereals, tobacco, tea and sugar beet from farmers at prices
determined by the government. The higher than world market prices have been
protected by import tariffs. The second most important component of the policy
has consisted of various subsidies, grants and exemptions lowering the cost of
inputs, including capital, fertiliser, seed, pesticides and water. The output of
tobacco, hazelnuts, tea and sugar beet has been controlled in various ways.
Services to farmers, such as research, training, extension and inspection services
were provided free or at low cost.
The present agricultural reforms in Turkey are a result of the Uruguay Round
agreement on agricultural trade, Turkey’s own efforts to adjust to the CAP, and
the conditions of the IMF programme. Under the reform programme output price
supports and input subsidies and grants in various forms will be phased out and
replaced by direct payments to farmers based on land holding, and tariffs will be
gradually reduced. Income support is capped at 20 hectares and it is estimated
that the total support will cost in excess of 2 billion euros. The reforms are being
implemented at present and are planned to be completed in two years’ time.
Privatisation of state enterprises in the agricultural sector is also part of the
programme. If the reforms are brought to completion, Turkey will have an agri-
cultural policy similar to the CAP; high intervention prices and protection from
the world market will have been replaced by direct income support, lower protec-
tion and prices approaching world market prices. Implementing the programme
requires extensive administrative reforms. For example, substantial investments
are needed in improving land registration, collecting agricultural data, and raising
veterinary and phytosanitary standards.
The Turkish reforms can be seen as a consequence of accession as well as the
need to reduce public expenditure. They will in the short run lead to considerable
efficiency gains, but also to substantial reduction in farmers’ income. Lower
administered prices and elimination of input subsidies are far from being com-
pensated by direct income support. It is estimated that total support – measured
per hectare of land under cultivation – will decline from $295 per hectare to $68,
including direct income supports (averages for 1997–99; OECD, 2000). Although
this represents a large reduction, it is fairly small in relation to total farm income.
In terms of the value of agricultural output, total support was estimated at 13 per
cent in 2000, which should be compared to the EU average of 38 per cent in 2000
(OECD, 2001). The present price reductions in Turkey will not bring prices down
to the new CAP levels. Disregarding any direct income compensations, adoption
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of the CAP would therefore lead to further reductions in incomes. However, we
also need to consider CAP subsidies to Turkish farmers. CAP subsidies are
largely, but not entirely, independent of the recipient country’s income level. If
Turkey benefits in full from CAP subsidies, her farmers will be able to raise their
income above the level existing before the present reforms, given that total sup-
port per hectare is much higher in the EU, or $845 annually on average in 1997–
99 (60 per cent of which consists of transfers from taxpayers; OECD, 2000). In
other words, accession is likely to provide a gain for Turkish farmers, provided
the present subsidy system is not changed and Turkey receives 100 per cent
equivalent of the present system of subsidies in the EU.
For agricultural production and trade the consequences of adopting the CAP,
including free trade with the EU, are less clear. The fact that prices in Turkey are
generally higher than in the EU indicates that agricultural production will con-
tract and the trade position with the EU deteriorate.6 Turkey had an agricultural
trade surplus of about 1.3 billion euros with the EU in 1999. Most of this was in
fruits, vegetables and tobacco, which can already enter the EU practically free.
The customs union in agricultural products between the EU and Turkey will
therefore have little effect on Turkey’s main export items. Vegetables, fruits
and tobacco have higher tariff protection in Turkey than in the EU when
imported from third countries. Adopting the EU tariff rates may therefore
induce some competition from imports. On the other hand, larger effects can be
expected for the main crops, wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize and sugar beet, since
they have administered prices that are scheduled for reduction both in the EU
and Turkey.
A recent study by Togan et al. (2003b) has shown that the adoption of the
CAP will lead, in the medium to long term, to a 1.9 per cent increase in real
household incomes in Turkey, but will require substantial adjustments on the part
of Turkish farmers, and that the effect on farmers’ incomes will be mainly driven
by the amount of CAP-like compensation payments granted to the farmers.
Farmers’ income will decrease considerably under Agenda 2000 policies without
direct payments, and will increase under Agenda 2000 policies with direct pay-
ments when these payments will be equal to those currently applied in the EU.
The annual budgetary cost to Turkey of adopting the CAP with direct payments,
when these payments will be equal to those currently applied in the EU, is
estimated to amount to 3 billion euros. On the other hand, when direct payments
will be made at the level of 35 per cent of payments granted in the EU member
countries, the annual budgetary cost will amount to 1.2 billion euros.
6 The administered prices in Turkey during 1999 were 58 per cent higher in the case of wheat,
13 per cent higher in the case of barley, 22 per cent higher in the case of maize and 32 per cent
higher in the case of sugar beet.
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c. Services and Network Industries
Joining the EU will require that Turkey liberalises its services and network
industries, which account for about 65 per cent of its GDP. In the following we
concentrate on the effects of liberalisation in the banking and electricity sectors
as representative sectors of the services and network industries respectively.
(i) The banking sector
One of the primary causes of the recent currency crisis in Turkey was the
unhealthy structure of the banking sector. First, there were problems with state
banks. Governments have used these banks for a number of non-commercial
objectives such as agricultural support, income redistribution, and industrial,
urban and physical infrastructural development, and they faced unrecovered costs
from duties carried out on behalf of the government, called ‘duty losses’. The
state banks covered their financing needs from markets borrowing at very high
interest rates and at short maturities. Second, the banking sector faced problems
created by high public sector deficits. As private banks found the financing of
public deficits increasingly profitable, the share of government domestic secur-
ities in total assets of domestic banks increased considerably. The banks became
vulnerable to changes in interest rates. Furthermore, during the 1990s the banks
started to borrow funds from abroad and with these funds they bought govern-
ment bonds.7 Banks, which became vulnerable not only to changes in interest
rates but also to changes in the exchange rate, underestimated the risks inherent
in overly extending investments in government paper and open foreign exchange
positions. Third, the 1994 crisis had led the authorities to take drastic measures
in order to save the economic system from collapse. The most controversial of
these was the introduction of a full (100 per cent) state guarantee for deposits.
This guarantee was effective in ending a bank rush as well as drastic shifts in
deposits from private banks to state-owned banks in 1994. However, the fear of
renewal of the banking crisis prevented the authorities abandoning this suppos-
edly temporary measure in favour of a reasonable deposit insurance scheme. In
addition, this decision led the banks to take higher risks and stimulated moral
hazard. Fourth, there were problems related to the legislative, regulatory and
institutional framework of the banking sector. Turkey lacked competent super-
visory authorities, a regulatory framework and legal and institutional infrastruc-
ture. In addition, the then prevailing prudential regulations were poorly enforced.
Since 1999 Turkey has taken measures to reform the regulatory and institutional
framework of the banking sector and restructure the state and private banks. In
7 The average excess return on Turkish government bonds over LIBOR both measured in US
dollars has amounted to 4.05 per cent over the period 1990–93 and 22.9 per cent over the period
1995–November 2000.
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1999 the Parliament passed a new banking law, which mandated the creation of
a new independent Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA). The
BRSA took over the bank regulation and supervision responsibilities previously
fulfilled by the Treasury and Central Bank. In the case of state banks the Treasury
provided floating rate notes to those banks securitising the duty losses, and strength-
ened their capital base. A law was introduced requiring the state banks to run no
more duty losses. Any support provided to the state banks will henceforth have to
be budgeted. The state banks are required to comply fully with all banking
regulations. On the other hand, the private banks, which had incurred significant
losses in the aftermath of the currency crises, were either taken over by the
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) or asked to strengthen their net worth
and balance sheet structure. Furthermore, the capital base of banks under SDIF
management has been strengthened by injection of government funds, and
measures were taken to facilitate bank mergers and prepare the state banks for
privatisation.
According to the Banks Act of December 1999 the establishment of a bank to
be founded as a joint stock company is subject to authorisation to be issued by
BRSA. Any candidate bank must be founded as a joint stock company, have
founders who are of sufficiently good repute and have sufficient experience in the
banking sector, and must have capital, paid in cash, which shall not be less than
TL20 trillion (US$14.3 million).8 According to the Banks Act, banks may exit
from the system through acquisition, merger and liquidation. Mergers are to be
realised with the permission of the BRSA Board. The Act also requires the
Competition Agency’s approval for mergers that exceed 20 per cent of the total
assets of the banking system. According to Article 14(3) of the Banks Act the
BRSA Board can revoke the licence of a bank to perform banking operations as
long as the conditions stated in Article 14(2) materialise.9
Currently, banks are required to maintain and keep an eight per cent capital
adequacy standard ratio, on a consolidated and unconsolidated basis, in order to
ensure that banks maintain an adequate amount of capital against losses which
may result from existing and potential risks. The consolidated financial reporting
requirements allow quarterly verification of the bank’s compliance with the con-
solidated capital adequacy requirement. When evaluating the capital adequacy
8 According to the 1977 First Banking Co-ordination Directive (77/780/EEC) and the 1989 Second
Banking Co-ordination Directive (89/646/EEC) any bank to be founded in the EU must have initial
capital of at least five million ECU, and have founders who are of sufficiently good repute and have
sufficient experience in the banking sector. There must be prior consultation with the competent
authorities. Thus Turkish regulations on the establishment of banks are in conformity with EU
rules.
9 If BRSA determines that a bank, the assets of which are insufficient or that fails to meet the
minimum level of capital, does not take the required measures to remedy the situation it may
revoke the licence of the bank.
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ratio banks are required to take capital charges for market risks such as foreign
exchange risk, interest rate risk and securities price fluctuation risk. Lately, the
maximum open foreign exchange position was reduced from 30 to 20 per cent.
Furthermore, the government requires banks to establish internal control and risk
management systems. The government has also taken steps to correct flaws con-
cerning the weak loan loss provisioning rule and the lenient large exposure and
connected lending limits. With the amendments to the Banks Act tighter limits
were imposed on both on- and off-balance sheet commitments to related parties
and especially to companies belonging to the same group. The bank shareholders
and managers became personally liable for the mismanagement and abuse of
bank resources. Since bank managers may attempt to under-report the size of
their bad assets and overstate their capital, the BRSA requires that banks intro-
duce internationally recognised accounting and auditing standards. The above
considerations reveal that Turkish prudential requirements as of 2003 are, in
general, in conformity with those in the EU regarding the capital adequacy
standards, loan classification and provisioning requirements, limits on large
exposures, limits on connected lending and requirements for liquidity and market
risk management.10
The objective of the legislative and regulatory reform has been to bring the
regulatory and supervisory regime for the Turkish financial sector up to the level
of international practice in line with EU standards. This objective has been achieved
to a large extent. A major issue that needs to be solved concerns the privatisation
of state banks. Recently, Turkey has decided to privatise the two largest state
banks within three years, to withdraw the banking licence of another state bank,
and resume the privatisation process of another large state bank as soon as mar-
ket conditions allow.11 What is needed now is strict enforcement of the rules by
the BRSA to cover all public and private banks in Turkey.12
Consideration of the data on the Turkish banking sector reveals that in the year
2001 private domestic banks accounted for about 53.6 per cent of total assets of
the banking sector with the five largest banks accounting for 36.1 per cent of total
10 According to Pazarbasıoglu (2003) the fiscal cost of the 2001 financial crisis has amounted to
24.6 billion euros (around 17 per cent of 2001 GDP). If Turkey had adopted the legislative, regula-
tory and institutional framework of the EU banking system at the beginning of the 1990s and had
enforced these rules, then the cost of the crisis would have been much smaller.
11 The state banks to be privatised within three years are Ziraat Bank and Halk Bank. The govern-
ment has withdrawn the banking licence of Emlakbank, and it will resume the privatisation process
of Vakifbank as soon as market conditions allow.
12 The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans of the banking system in Turkey has reached
about 22 per cent in 2001. The situation has improved during 2002 due to acceleration of out-of-
court settlements and voluntary debt restructuring arrangements. However, non-performing loans
still stood at a high level of 17.5 per cent of total loans at the end of 2002. It has been emphasised
that strict enforcement of the rules would lead to further takeovers of private banks by SDIF. The
budgetary burden would then make the country’s debt dynamics more difficult.
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assets. While the share of foreign banks in total banking assets amounted to
2.6 per cent, the share of state banks was 27.2 per cent and the share of banks
managed by the SDIF was 11.7 per cent. Thus foreign banks in terms of their
shares in total credits and deposits remain insignificant in Turkey.
With Turkish accession to the EU, competition in the financial sector will
increase as Turkey recognises the Supervisory Authorities’ competence of EU
member states and introduces to its legislature the principle of home country
control. According to Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) the share
of foreign bank assets in total bank assets over the 1988–95 period averaged
77 per cent in Greece, 31 per cent in Spain, 61 per cent in Hungary, 51 per cent
in the Czech Republic and only 1 per cent in Turkey. Thus with liberalisation in
financial markets the penetration rates of foreign banks in Turkey are expected to
increase substantially, causing adjustment costs in the sector. Increased competi-
tion will improve the quality and availability of financial services in the domestic
market, enable the application of modern banking skills and technology, enhance
the country’s access to international capital, lower prices for consumers and lead
to a larger variety of financial instruments. Some of the Turkish banks will
benefit from larger markets by concentrating on activities in which they have
a comparative advantage. Other Turkish banks may be forced to merge with
foreign banks or exit from the market.
(ii) Electricity
In 2001 Turkey had an installed power-generating capacity of about 28.8 GW.
While electricity consumption has been growing at an annual average of 9 per
cent over the last decade reaching 126.5 TWh in 2001, the demand for electricity
is forecasted to grow at an annual rate of 8 to 10 per cent over the next ten years.
This growth will require annual investment of about US$3 billion in generation,
transmission and distribution. The Turkish electricity sector is dominated by state-
owned enterprises. The two largest firms are TEAS, the state-owned generation-
and-transmission company, and TEDAS, the state-owned distribution company.
Recently, TEAS was separated into three separate companies covering genera-
tion, trading and transmission activities. In the sector, privatisation has been
widespread for some time. There are privately owned firms which have entered
the industry through build-operate-transfer (BOT) or auto-generator schemes.
They account for about 21 per cent of electricity generation. In addition there are
four private distribution companies active on the Asian side of Istanbul, Kayseri,
Adana and Antalya. Furthermore, five build-operate-own (BOO) contracts for
electricity generation were competitively bid, and transfer of operating rights
contracts (TOORs) have been awarded for 8 thermal plants and 14 distribution
regions.
Although privatisation can be thought of as a legal transfer of assets from the
government to a private operator many of the benefits of privatisation come with
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the transfer of risk. When private companies bear risk, privatisation can be
expected to lead to efficiency gains. Under the current regulations in Turkey the
private owners in the electricity sector bear construction and operating cost risks.
The private operator signs a long-term power purchase agreement with the state-
owned generation enterprise in which the latter commits itself to buy the output
of the plant for a period of, say, 20 years at a fixed price in foreign currency.
While the price has ranged on average between eight and nine US cents per KWh
for the first five to ten years of operation in BOT projects, the BOO projects tend
to have lower prices. This contract, guaranteed by the Treasury, assures the
investor that the project will be profitable irrespective of future demand for
power. As a result the government retains the commercial risks. But there have
been significant problems with these arrangements. The high cost electricity
purchase agreements have exposed TEAS to significant losses and contingent
liabilities. The financial position of the TEAS/TEDAS is poor partly due to high
cost BOT contracts that involve purchase costs to TEAS in excess of subsequent
sales prices to TEDAS set by the government.
Recently, the government in Turkey has passed a new Electricity Law.
The law provides for the establishment of a new independent Energy Market
Regulatory Authority, which takes over regulatory functions from the Ministry of
Natural Resources. Standard regulatory functions include tariff setting, market
monitoring and access dispute settlements. With the new law the government is
introducing a market model as in the EU that will transfer most of the task of
supplying and distributing electricity and the associated market risks to the private
sector, eliminate the need for additional state-guaranteed power purchase agree-
ments, and minimise costs through competitive pressures on producers and dis-
tributors along the EU model. The government will largely withdraw from the
electricity generation and distribution businesses. Electricity generation com-
panies will sign contracts for power directly with distribution companies without
government guarantees. The government’s future role will be largely confined to
determining sector policy, owning the transmission system, and making sure that
the rules are respected and that prices are competitively determined. Once the
new Electricity Law is implemented the regulatory and supervisory regime for
the electricity sector will be brought up to the level of international practice in
line with EU standards. Currently Turkey faces major problems exiting from
the old system, but once the system starts to operate Turkey expects to derive
efficiency gains in the sector resulting in price reductions and improvements in
the quality of the service.13
13 Because of the various BOT and BOO contracts signed in the past the establishment of a
competitive environment may take quite a long time.
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d. Trade and Growth Effects of Accession
When considering the effects of integration on the Turkish economy, it is
important to keep in mind that the customs union in industrial goods was estab-
lished in 1996 and that a period of perhaps ten years or more will precede full
membership and Turkish participation in the internal market. Membership will
add free trade in agricultural goods and services and free mobility for labour
(eventually) and capital. Furthermore, Turkey within a few years of EU accession
will need to satisfy the Maastricht criteria and join the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU).
The impact of the customs union in industrial goods on Turkish welfare has
been estimated by Harrison et al. (1997). The authors consider the effects of tariff
reductions, improved access to EU markets due to elimination of voluntary export
restraints and harmonisation of product quality standards and improvements in
testing laboratories in Turkey and reduced costs of trading due to the reduction in
border costs estimate the gains to Turkey of 1.1 per cent of its GDP per year.
If liberalising trade in industrial goods can affect the GDP, then there should
be comparable gains from liberalising agriculture and also services that are be-
coming increasingly tradable. It is emphasised that trade liberalisation in agricul-
ture will lead to efficiency gains. On the other hand, an efficient and well regulated
financial sector leads to an efficient transformation of savings to investment, and
benefits also arise from increased financial product variety and better risk sharing
in the economy. In the case of telecommunications, improved efficiency generates
economy-wide benefits as telecommunications are a vital intermediate input and
are also crucial to the dissemination and diffusion of knowledge. Similar consider-
ations apply to the electricity sector as energy is an indispensable input into pro-
duction and inefficient production of energy acts as a tax on production. Following
Ritson and Harvey (1997) and Deardorff (2001) one could then argue that Turkey
will derive considerable gains from eliminating barriers to trade in services.
The above considerations reveal that integration will remove the distortions in
the price system, which in turn will boost the allocative efficiency in the economy.
As a side effect, this heightened efficiency will make the country a better place in
which to invest. Investment will increase and hence foreign direct investment.
Thus the allocative efficiency gains from integration will be boosted by induced
capital formation. While investment increases above its normal level the Turkish
economy will experience a growth effect. All this means improved material
wellbeing for Turkish people in the long term.14
Furthermore with accession Turkey will be eligible for EU structural funds. As
a result infrastructural investments will increase, which in turn will contribute to
14 The process described above summarises briefly the impact of EU membership on Spain, Portugal
and Ireland.
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economic growth. Finally, within a few years of EU accession Turkey will abandon
its national currency and adopt the euro. As stressed by Mundell (1961), currency
union will reduce the costs of international transactions and promote trade and
openness. Frankel and Rose (2002) note that belonging to a currency union
triples trade with other currency union members, that there is no evidence of
trade diversion, and that every per cent increase in the country’s overall trade
relative to GDP raises income per capita by at least one-third of one per cent.
Consideration of the effects of membership on the pattern of trade between the
EU-15 and Turkey reveals that the trade pattern in industrial goods will not be
affected significantly since the customs union was already established in 1996.
Trade in agricultural goods will be affected, but the major effects will be in
Turkey, not in the EU-15, since import barriers are relatively low for Turkish
agricultural exports. Turkey’s comparative advantage will for some decades to
come be in low skilled, low wage activities in manufacturing. Compared to the
CEEC-10, Turkey has less human capital and skills, because of a generally much
lower level of secondary and higher education. The average level of schooling
for an adult is 4.5 years. It was only recently that Turkey raised the mandatory
minimum length of schooling from five to eight years.
Although the pattern of Turkish–EU trade is not expected to change substan-
tially as a result of full membership, there is considerable potential for an in-
crease in the volume of trade. The recent experience of the CEEC-10 shows that
trade volumes have increased substantially as a result of large investments by
firms from Western Europe and elsewhere, which combine their technical, mana-
gerial and marketing assets with a generally well educated and skilled labour
force at low wages. Turkey has a long way to go before it can hope to attract
foreign direct investment to the same extent as some of the more successful
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, Turkey attracted $15 per
capita in foreign direct investment in 2000 compared to $256 in Poland, the
most successful of the CEECs. Foreign direct investment in Turkey is hampered
by economic and political uncertainty, government intervention, bureaucracy and
detailed regulation. Turkey’s investment climate has one of the lowest ratings in
the UN’s Direct Investment Index. Membership and adoption of the acquis will
go some way towards establishing a better investment climate, which in turn will
lead to higher volumes of trade in the same way as in the CEEC-10.
We have forecasted the volume of trade between Turkey and the EU-15 under
the assumption that it will reach the same level of intensity as trade between the
EU member states at present.15 The forecast is based on estimation of a gravity
function for trade within the EU-15. The gravity function has been used to
explain the volume of bilateral international trade since the 1960s and has proven
15 These results were obtained in collaboration with Harry Flam.
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to be remarkably successful. It postulates that the volume of trade between a pair
of countries is a function of the size of the trade partners, measured by GDP,
population or geographic area, of their income level or capital abundance, meas-
ured by GDP per capita, and of trade costs, measured by a variety of factors, such
as tariffs and other administratively imposed trade barriers, geographic distance,
common borders, common language or common legal systems.16 We have estim-
ated the following standard version of the gravity equation:
log[(exports from country i to country j + exports from country j to country i)/2]
= constant + β1 log(GDP of country i × GDP of country j)
+ β2 log(GDP per capita in country i × GDP per capita in country j)
+ β3 log geographical distance + dummy for common land border + error term.
The dependent variable in the gravity equation is the logarithmic average of
bilateral exports. It is explained by the logarithmic product of GDP; the volume
of trade is simply assumed to rise in proportion to the combined economic size of
the trade partners. GDP per capita can be thought of as a measure of product
differentiation and specialisation. The higher the per capita income is, the more
differentiated is taste and production, and the larger is the volume of trade based
on product differentiation and increasing returns to scale. A high per capita in-
come is also an indication of abundance of physical and human capital relative to
manual labour. Thus, the per capita variable should serve to capture both intra-
industry trade caused by product differentiation and increasing returns to scale,
and inter-industry trade caused by differences in factor endowments. Trade costs
are controlled by the inclusion of geographical distance and a common land
border. Geographical distance is an indicator of transportation costs, but also of
the costs of cultural differences which tend to increase with geographic distance.
Finally, a common land border is thought to have a level effect on the volume of
trade.
The estimates of the gravity equation are presented in Table 2. Two estimation
methods were used, OLS and random-effects GLS. The two methods yield similar
estimates and the gravity equation explains more than 90 per cent of the variation
in the data. All coefficients are estimated with a very high level of statistical
16 Note that standard versions of the gravity equation can be derived from all three basic trade
models, the Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and increasing returns to scale models, as well as from
other models, as demonstrated by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1990), Deardorff (1998) and
Helpman (1998). Recent research by Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (1999) and Evenett and Keller
(2002) has sought to ascertain to what extent the various models contribute to the empirical success
of the gravity equation and thereby to evaluate their empirical relevance. A tentative conclusion is
that models based on increasing returns and product differentiation are more successful in explain-
ing intra-industry trade, while trade in homogeneous goods is better explained by factor endowment
differences or differentiation of goods by country of origin (the Armington assumption).
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TABLE 2
Pooled Panel Gravity Estimates for Intra-EU-15 Trade
OLS (1) OLS (2) Random-effects GLS
Log real product 0.857686 0.881789 0.803127
GDP (0.0098) (0.0120) (0.0266)
Log real product −0.28017 0.243911 −0.37215
GDP per capita (0.0362) (0.0384) (0.0342)
Log distance −0.8819 – −0.93738
(0.0326) – (0.0948)
Common border 0.399995 1.255733 0.417394
(0.0516) (0.0673) (0.1780)
R2: Within – – 0.3897
R2: Between – – 0.9275
R2: Overall 0.9249 0.8797 0.9227
Notes:
GDP and Population data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 70 (December 2001). Trade data from OECD
Monthly Statistics of International Trade CD-ROM (June 2001) and great circle distances between capitals from
the website (http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm). 1,155 observations, annual data for 15 coun-
tries, 1990–2000. Intercept and year controls not recorded. Standard errors within parentheses. All estimates
significant at less than one per cent.
17 For an excellent discussion of methodological and modelling issues confronted when applying
gravity modelling to the analysis of regionalism, see Greenaway and Milner (2002).
significance (less than one per cent) and have the expected sign, with one excep-
tion. The product of real per capita GDP is found to have an unexpected, negative
effect on the volume of trade, when distance is taken into consideration. How-
ever, the coefficient changes sign and becomes positive and highly significant
when distance is left out of the regression, as in the second column. Clearly, the
results indicate that income differentials between present EU members and dis-
tance are positively correlated.
The OLS estimates of the gravity equation in the first column were then used
to make forecasts of bilateral trade for each of the CEEC-10 and Turkey with the
EU-15. The results are presented in Table 3. As can be seen, the forecasted value
of Turkish–EU-15 trade is $26.1 billion in 2000, which is almost 41 per cent
higher than the actual average value of $18.5 billion for the period 1999–2001.
Most of the CEEC-10 are also projected to increase their trade with the EU-15,
some of them considerably more so than Turkey, while two countries – Estonia
and Hungary – have higher actual than projected trade. Note, however, the point
estimates obtained with our forecast method are highly uncertain as shown by the
95 per cent confidence intervals for the point estimates.17
Next, we assume that Turkey eventually will have a share of EU trade to total
trade that is equal to that of the four large EU countries, namely 58 per cent.
Then total trade of Turkey can be shown to increase to $45 billion. When we
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TABLE 3
Forecast of Trade with EU-15
Country Forecast 95 Per Cent Forecast/Actual




Bulgaria 4.1 1.5 11.3 1.82
Czech Republic 22.5 8.3 60.2 1.29
Estonia 1.7 0.6 4.7 0.69
Hungary 13.8 5.1 37.2 0.80
Lithuania 3.2 1.2 8.7 1.82
Latvia 2.3 0.9 6.2 1.59
Poland 38.7 14.4 104.0 1.75
Romania 9.6 3.6 26.2 1.63
Slovak Republic 10.2 3.8 28.0 2.02
Slovenia 6.7 2.5 18.0 1.26
Turkey 26.1 9.7 70.3 1.41
Notes:
GDP and Population data from World Development Indicators On-line (World Bank). Trade data from OECD
Monthly Statistics of International Trade CD-ROM (June 2001) and great circle distances between capitals from
the website (http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm).
divide this value by the average value of GDP for 1999–2001 we arrive at a
ratio between the average of exports and imports to GDP of 25.2 per cent. The
actual value of total trade to GDP over the 1999–2001 period, on the other hand,
is 20.67 per cent. Noting from Frankel and Rose (2002) that every per cent
increase in the country’s overall trade relative to GDP raises income per capita
by at least one-third of one per cent we can state that with EU accession income
per capita in Turkey will increase by about 1.5 per cent.
4. EFFECTS OF ACCESSION ON THE EU18
The effects of Turkish accession on the EU are analysed in the following
under the headings of migration and budgetary effects.
a. Migration
The PPP-adjusted income per capita in the EU is more than three times higher
than in Turkey. It will probably take decades before Turkey attains an income
18 This section is based on the work of Harry Flam.
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level comparable to that of the EU-15. The income differential will continue to
be a strong incentive for migration from Turkey to the EU. Turkish migration to
Western Europe was particularly high in the 1960s, but a steady flow has continued,
particularly to Germany and, to a lesser extent, to the Netherlands. A period of
active recruitment of foreign labour in many of the present EU countries in the
1950s and 1960s ended after the first oil crisis in 1973–74. Since then immigra-
tion policies have become successively more restrictive, and immigrants have
mostly consisted of relatives of former immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers.
Most migrants from Turkey have ended up in Germany, which has a population
of 2.1 million with Turkish origins. The second largest recipient has been the
Netherlands, with 250,000 immigrants and their descendants from Turkey.
The prospect of large-scale immigration from Turkey and the other candidate
countries is a source of considerable concern among the EU-15, where it is feared
that the immigrants will depress wages, boost unemployment and cause social
friction and political upheavals. Free migration will surely not be allowed imme-
diately upon full membership, but only after some period of transition. In the
case of the CEEC-10, the length of the transition period is still to be agreed upon.
A transition period of seven years was applied for Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Austria, Finland and Sweden were under no migration restrictions when they
became members.
(i) Theory
The effects of migration from Turkey to any of the EU-15 member states can
be illustrated with the help of Figure 3. The horizontal axis measures the total
supply of labour in Turkey and – say – Germany. We will simplify at first and
assume that labour is a homogeneous factor of production. Later we will take
account of the fact that labour is differentiated by education, training and experi-
ence. Demand by employers for labour in Turkey is shown by the demand curve
DT. Likewise, demand for labour in Germany is shown by the demand curve DG.
The total supply of labour in Germany and Turkey is assumed to be fixed.
Initially, it is divided up so that the supply of labour in Turkey is measured by the
length of the line segment LTL0 and the supply of labour in Germany by the
length of the line segment LGL0. The supply of labour in each country is assumed
to be inelastic. Before migration is allowed, the equilibrium wage in Germany is
wG and it is much higher than the equilibrium wage in Turkey, wT.
When free migration is allowed, labour will move from Turkey to Germany in
order to earn the higher wage. Migration stops when the wage is equalised
between the two countries, at the level w, and L1L0 of labour has moved from
Turkey to Germany. Thus, one effect of migration is that it raises the wage in the
sending country and lowers the wage in the receiving country. Migrants as well
as those remaining in Turkey gain, while German workers lose. The effects for
capital owners are opposite. Turkish capital owners now earn the surplus TwE
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instead of TwTC, while German capital owners earn GwE instead of GwGA. (We
assume that capital does not migrate in response to eventual earnings differ-
ences.) The fact that part of the labour force has moved from Turkey to Germany
also means that the Turkish GDP declines and the German GDP rises. All of
these changes amount to an increase in aggregate social surplus or welfare. The
increase is given by the area ACE and it is captured by German capital owners
and Turkish migrants. The welfare increase is due to a more efficient allocation
of labour; Turkish labourers become more efficient when they are moved to
Germany and the optimal allocation is achieved when the marginal productivity
of labour in Germany and Turkey is equalised.
Figure 3 provides a simplistic yet powerful analysis of the income, redistribu-
tion, output and welfare effects of migration. It is built on the assumption that
migration is entirely driven by a wage differential and that no unemployment
exists. Unemployment can easily be added to the model. Assume that before
migration is allowed, L1L0 of the Turkish labour force is unemployed. Those
employed now earn a higher wage, w instead of wT. Assume also that employ-
ment is decided by a daily lottery. Thus, the expected wage (the actual wage w
times the probability of winning employment) is lower than the actual wage and
lies somewhere between w and wT. The expected wage in Turkey is still below
the certain wage wG in Germany, so labour will migrate to Germany once migra-
tion is allowed. Assume that all the unemployed in Turkey migrate to Germany,
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migrants. Employment in Germany is also decided by a daily lottery, in which
German and Turkish workers have equal probabilities of winning. The expected
wage therefore falls below wG but not all the way to w. Thus, in the new equilib-
rium the actual and expected wage are higher in Germany than the actual wage in
Turkey. In the new equilibrium, in which migration has stopped, the expected
wage can be higher in Germany because workers attach a negative value to the
risk of becoming unemployed. They demand a higher expected wage to compen-
sate for the risk.
It is seen that Turkish migration can serve both to depress wages in the receiv-
ing country and to raise unemployment. Changes in the assumptions made, such
as allowing unemployment to remain in Turkey, employment to increase in Ger-
many or Turkish workers having a higher risk of becoming unemployed, would
not change the basic conclusions. One assumption in the analysis is, however,
questionable, namely that labour is homogeneous. In reality, labour is highly
differentiated according to education, training, experience and many other char-
acteristics. Thus, we do not have just two factors of production – labour and
capital – but many types of labour and many types of capital as well. As soon as
we allow for three or more factors, the effects of migration for income distribu-
tion and social welfare become less clear-cut.19 In general, the effects for native
labour and capital become more favourable when immigrants are complements to
rather than substitutes for the native factors. For example, if the German labour
force is skilled and the Turkish immigrants are unskilled, then immigrants tend to
increase the productivity and wages of German workers. Likewise, the increase
in social surplus from migration tends to rise the more complementary migrants
and native workers are. In terms of Figure 3, smaller substitutability between
labour and capital means that the demand curves become steeper and that the size
of the surplus triangles become, up to a point, greater.
The decision to migrate is of course not only dependent on relative wages and
unemployment, but on many other factors as well. The early theoretical research
focused on income differentials and individual decisions, as in Berry and Soligo
(1969). Recent research stresses that migration is a household decision, and that
social networks, culture, language, geographical distance and other factors are
important as well.20
(ii) Forecasts of migration from Turkey to Germany
We have made a forecast of Turkish migration to Germany under the assump-
tion that such migration will be completely free from restrictions. Our forecast is
based on an estimated model of immigration to Germany from the EU-15,
Norway, Turkey, the USA and the former Yugoslavia by Boeri and Brücker
19 See Borjas (1995).
20 For a survey, see Ghatak et al. (1996).
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(2000). The choice of Germany is dictated first by the fact that Germany holds by
far the largest population of Turkish immigrants among the EU-15 and therefore
can be expected to attract the largest numbers of future immigrants, and second,
the paucity of data on migration flows and stocks before the 1990s for most of
the other EU-15 countries.
Boeri and Brücker (2000) estimated how the flow of migration depends on the
wage differential, employment rates in the home and host countries, the stock of
migrants from the home country, restrictions on migration, and country specifics
such as language differences, distance and institutions. The migration decision is
seen as dependent on expectations about the future wage differential. This is
based on past and present values of the differential, which is conditioned by the
individual probability of finding employment in the host country relative to the
home country. This, in turn, is assumed to be based on past and present average
employment rates, on the ease of adjustment, which is proxied to the size of the
presence of earlier migrants, on the difference in development between the home
and host countries and language differences, and on agreements regulating
migration, such as guest-worker agreements. Migration flows are seen as short-
run adjustments to a long-run equilibrium in which migration has ceased and the
stock of migrants has attained an equilibrium level dependent on the wage differ-
ential, the employment rate differential, restrictions on migration and the country-
specific factors. The long-run equilibrium is also estimated, giving long-run
relations between the stock of migrants and the explanatory variables.21 The
existence of a long-run equilibrium builds on the assumption that the propensity
to migrate has a certain distribution in the home country; the equilibrium is
reached when those with the highest propensity have emigrated for given long-
run values of the explanatory variables, and those remaining do not find it worth-
while to emigrate.22
21 The assumptions and the model are described in detail in Boeri and Brücker (2000).
22 Boeri and Brücker (2000) first estimate an (error-correction) model taking account of migration
responses to short-run deviations from long-run equilibrium relations. The signs of the coefficients
on the explanatory variables correspond to the signs found in the estimation. The equation was
estimated with data on migration to Germany from 18 industrialised countries during the period
1967–1998. This equation is:
Change in migrant population in receiving country/population of sending country = β1(country-
specific factors) + β2(change in GDP per capita in sending country relative to receiving coun-
try) + β3(change in employment in receiving country) − β4(change in employment in sending
country) + β5(GDP per capita in sending country relative to receiving country in the previous
year) + β6(employment in the receiving country in the previous year) − β7(employment in the
sending country in the previous year) − β8(migrant population/population of sending country, in
the previous year) + β9(dummy variable for free migration) + β10(dummy variable for guest
worker agreement).
The long-run equilibrium relations between the ratio of the migrant population in the receiving
country relative to the population of the sending country on the one hand and the explanatory
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We have used the Boeri and Brücker (2000) estimation of the migration equation
to forecast free migration from Turkey to Germany from 2000 to 2030. To make
a forecast, we have to make assumptions for the whole period about population and
GDP growth rates, and about employment rates. For population growth, we have
used the forecasts given by the World Bank in its World Development Indicators
database. For GDP, we simply assume a GDP growth rate for Germany equal to
the average for 1990–2000. The GDP and population growth rates yield a GDP
per capita growth rate of 1.7 per cent. For Turkey we assume a higher GDP growth
rate. We make forecasts based on the assumption that 1, 2 or 3 per cent of the per
capita income gap is closed per year. This means that GDP per capita in Turkey
grows at about 9, 12 or 15 per cent in the beginning of the period and at about
3 per cent at the end. The average rate is about 5.5 per cent for the 2 per cent
assumption. The Turkish GDP growth rate has been about 5 per cent over the last
five decades. Our assumption implies that GDP growth has to increase by about
2 percentage points for GDP per capita to grow at 5.5 per cent. The forecast
results are shown in Figure 4. As can be seen, the Turkish immigrant population
starts out at about 2.2 million in 2000 and reaches about 3.5 million in 2030
under the assumption that no restrictions are placed on migration.23
b. EU Budget Transfers to Turkey and Other Candidate Countries
The structure of the present system of EU revenue and expenditure is such
that rich member states transfer resources to poor members, but the relation
between income per capita and net transfer is far from straight. Some rich coun-
tries give proportionately more than others, while some poor countries receive a
disproportionate share of the transfers. Turkey and the CEEC-10 are all poor
relative to the EU-15. Much attention has therefore been given to the budgetary
variables on the other can be found by setting the changes in equation (1) equal to zero and
estimating the resulting equation which describes the long-run equilibrium relations as follows:
Migrant population in receiving country/population of sending country = (β1/−β8) (country-
specific factors) + (β2/−β8) (GDP per capita in sending country relative to receiving country)
+ (β6/−β8) (employment in receiving country) − (β7/−β8) (employment in the sending country)
+ (β9/−β8) (dummy variable for free migration) + (β10/−β8) (dummy variable for guest worker
agreement).
The signs of the coefficients within parentheses correspond to the estimated signs. As expected, in
the long run the migrant population in the receiving country is positively related to the income
differential between the sending and receiving country, the employment rate in the receiving
country, free migration and guest worker agreements, and is negatively related to the employment
rate in the sending country.
23 It must be stressed that the forecast is highly uncertain. It depends on the specification of
the migration model, the estimates of the model, which themselves are uncertain, and on heroic
assumptions about GDP and population growth rates. Furthermore, we assume that estimates made
for a group of countries during a certain time period in the past, can be applied for a different
country pair and a different time period.
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FIGURE 4
Forecast of the Turkish Immigrant Population in Germany
Note:
Forecasts for 1, 2 and 3 per cent convergence rate of per capita income between Germany and Turkey.
Source: Own calculation.
effects for the EU of enlargement on the presumption that enlargement will be
very costly for the EU-15. The present net recipients from the EU budget seem to
fear that transfer to them will be cut, and the net contributors fear that they will
be required to raise their contributions.
The major items on the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget in 2002
are shown in Table 4. Revenues are collected from three sources: the member
states’ VAT revenues, customs duties collected by member states and a tax
related to the member states’ GNP. The total contribution to the EU budget is, by
decision, capped at an amount equal to 1.27 per cent of GNP annually until 2006,
when the present long-term budget ends.
Expenditures have two main destinations: the CAP and the so-called Structural
Operations aimed at disadvantaged countries and regions. The CAP was until
recently built on price supports. Starting in 1993, the CAP has gradually been
shifting away from price to income support. On the other hand, Structural Opera-
tions are based on criteria of relative income level, under-development and the
structural problems of particular regions and countries. Regional support is given
by the so-called Structural Funds. For example, to be eligible for support under
the classification of ‘Objective 1’ a region has to have a per capita income less
than 75 per cent of the EU average. Nearly 70 per cent of Structural Operations
expenditure fall under this classification. The Cohesion Fund is by construc-
tion exclusively directed at Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Cohesion Fund
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TABLE 4
The EU Budget in 2002
Revenues Expenditures
Million Share in Million Share in
Euro Per Cent Euro Per Cent
Duties and levies 15,267 17 Agriculture 40,506 49
VAT 35,193 40 Structural Operations 27,591 33
GDP 37,580 43 Internal Operations 5,361 6
Correction* −71 External expenditure 5,231 6
Total 87,969 100 Administrative exp. 4,643 6
Other revenue 4,755
Total 92,724 Total 83,331 100
Notes:
* Due to exchange rate differences. ** Interest, surplus from previous years, fines, taxes on salaries of employees
of European institutions, etc.
Source: European Commission, Allocation of 2000 EU operating expenditure by Member State, Table 5a
and 5b.
expenditure is rather modest, or about 2 per cent of the total budget, but is
important for the recipient countries. Relative to GDP, the largest recipients of
Structural Funds are Greece and Portugal, which receive the equivalent of more
than 2 per cent of their GDP, and Spain, which receives more than 1 per cent.
One way to calculate Turkey’s contributions to and receipts from the EU
budget would be to estimate the ‘tax base’, i.e. VAT and tariff revenue and GNP,
and the extent to which Turkish agriculture and regions are eligible for support
from the CAP, Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. The calculation is likely
to come up with a large net transfer to Turkey, both because of the size of the
agricultural sector and because Turkey is poor and under-developed relative to
the EU-15. We find it unlikely that the EU-15 will accept Turkey as a member if
it proves to be very costly. Turkish accession will come after the accession of
most of the CEEC-10, Cyprus and Malta. These countries are also poor – with
the exception of Cyprus – and have relatively large agricultural sectors. When the
EU-15 determines new rules for contributions to and receipts from the budget it
will consider the budgetary effects of accepting all of the present 13 candidate
members. Since the EU-15 will be relatively large net contributors after enlarge-
ment under the present rules, they will, we argue, want to change the rules in
order to reduce the amount of redistribution from rich to poor member states.
Their ability to do so before enlargement is of course great. The question is what
will happen once enlargement has taken place?
The history of past enlargements shows that rules are changed if an acceding
country becomes a disproportionately large net contributor or is a disadvantaged
recipient of CAP or Structural Funds support under existing rules. The United
Kingdom has a relatively small agricultural sector and receives relatively little
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CAP support. After a long struggle, it won a permanent rebate – a ‘correction of
budgetary imbalances’ – on its contribution. Portugal and Spain receive relatively
little CAP funding because their agriculture produces relatively little grain. After
their accession, it was decided to limit aggregate CAP spending in favour of
Structural Funds spending, something that benefited Portugal and Spain. The
Cohesion Fund set up in 1993 – ostensibly to help the poor members cope with
EMU – can also be seen as a compensation to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
Austria, Finland and Sweden do not have poor regions eligible for much support
from Structural Funds. However, they managed to gain support for sparsely popu-
lated Alpine and Arctic regions when negotiating the terms of accession. Baldwin
et al. (1997) provide a more detailed account of how eligibility criteria and the
expenditure pattern have been adjusted in successive enlargements of the EU.
The rules for contributions to and receipts from the EU budget favour poor
countries, since contributions are more or less proportional to income per capita
while Structural Operations are targeted at poor countries and regions to raise
their income relative to richer countries and regions. The CAP has a bias towards
temperate climates and therefore the richer members, but not enough to overturn
the redistributive effects of Structural Operations. What the budget rules will be
after the CEEC-10, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey have joined depends in the final
instance on the voting power of the new members and the voting rules.
Present rules give small countries more voting power per capita than large
countries. Consider the extremes: Germany with a population of 83 million has
ten votes in the Council while Luxembourg with a population of 400,000 has
two, giving voters in Luxembourg 42 times the voting power of voters in Germany.
Most of the candidate countries are relatively small. The largest are Turkey, with
65 million, Poland, 38 million, and Romania, with 23 million. Overall, poor coun-
tries will have more votes in EU-28 than in EU-15. There are at present 87 votes
in the Council. Under existing rules, decisions have to be either unanimous or
made with a qualified majority of 71 per cent (62 votes). Under the new rules
agreed on at the European Council meeting in Nice, 74 per cent of the votes will
be required for a qualified majority starting in 2005. The 13 candidate countries will
add as many as 53 votes to the Council, based on the present allocation of votes
according to population size.24 Turkey should receive 10 votes, the same number
as France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have each. Thus, a coalition
of poor, new member states can easily block decision-making in the EU-28.
Voting power should therefore be a good indicator of how much a country
receives from the EU in the form of CAP and Structural Operations support. The
history of enlargement has shown that if new members feel disadvantaged under
24 The Nice Treaty has increased the number of votes in the Council to 348 when the EU has been
enlarged to include the CEEC-10, Cyprus and Malta (but not Turkey). The new distribution of
votes per member state is more differentiated with respect to population size than the present
distribution, but the voting power distribution is still very regressive.
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existing rules, they will change the rules and eligibility criteria to achieve an out-
come that is more favourable. At the same time, GDP per capita is a good indicator
of how much a country has to contribute to the EU budget. An alternative way of
calculating the budgetary effects for new members is therefore to estimate the
contribution per capita in the EU-15 based on income per capita, and to estimate the
receipts per capita based on per capita Council votes and on the level of develop-
ment in a broader sense, as indicated by eligibility for Cohesion Fund status.
The results of such an estimation are shown in Table 5. As can be seen, GDP per
capita alone can explain 82 per cent of the variation in contributions per capita
among the EU-15. The estimated effect is highly significant. As for receipts per
capita, the number of votes per capita and Cohesion Fund status can explain as
much as 87 per cent of the variation in the data. The effect of voting power is
borderline significant (it is significant at the 10 per cent but not at the 5 per cent
confidence level), while the effect of Cohesion Status is highly significant.
The estimates of Table 5 were then used to estimate the contribution and
receipts of each of the candidate countries shown in Table 6. It must be remembered
that these estimates are based on the present distribution of votes among the EU-
15 and present rules for contributions and receipts. The total net transfer to the
13 countries is quite large, or 49 billion euros. This is equivalent to more than half
of the present budget of the EU-15. Turkey would receive the largest net transfer,
about 14 billion euros.25 The second largest net receiver is Poland, with about
9 billion. The smaller countries receive net transfers that are much larger per
TABLE 5




GDP per capita 0.010079
(0.0007)
Votes per capita 22.91323
(8.9696)
Cohesion status × votes per capita 670.4564
(39.3141)
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.87
Notes:
Data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 70 (December 2001) and Euro Conversion Rates from IMF/IFS
(March 2002). OLS, 45 observations, annual data for 15 countries, 1998–2000. Standard errors within parentheses.
25 The estimates are obtained under the assumption that there are no upper bounds on the receipts
of the candidate countries. But according to EU rules transfers from the Structural Funds and
Cohesion Fund cannot exceed 4 per cent of GDP, placing an upper bound on the amount that
candidate countries can receive from the EU under Structural and Cohesion Funds. According to
Togan et al. (2003b) Turkey, when these constraints are taken into account, would receive annual































Forecast of Contributions and Receipts in 2000
Country Contributions Receipts Contributions Receipts Per Council 95 Per Cent
(Millions 4) (Millions 4) Per Capita, 4 Capita, 4 Votes Confidence Interval
Contributions Receipts
Per Cent Per Cent
Bulgaria 285 4,072 35 499 4 233 26
Cyprus 109 166 144 220 2 54 61
Czech Rep. 746 5,100 73 496 5 110 27
Estonia 80 2,298 58 1,678 3 138 13
Hungary 685 5,060 68 505 5 117 26
Latvia 123 2,457 52 1,036 3 156 15
Lithuania 193 2,667 52 722 3 154 19
Malta 46 1,449 118 3,715 2 66 12
Poland 2,445 11,691 63 303 8 127 43
Romania 825 7,727 37 344 6 222 38
Slovak Rep. 310 2,939 57 544 3 140 24
Slovenia 234 2,396 118 1,205 3 66 14
Turkey 3,409 17,313 52 265 10 154 49
Notes:
Data from World Development Indicators On-line (World Bank) and Euro Conversion Rates from IMF/IFS (March 2002). Forecast based on estimates in Table XX.
Assumed number of votes in Council of Ministers. All countries are assumed to have Cohesion Fund status, except Cyprus.
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capita than the larger countries, due to their higher voting power. Although the
net receipts to Turkey are the largest, the receipts per capita are the smallest.
Turkey would receive 263 euros per capita, which is less than any country with
Cohesion Status, while Malta, the smallest country, would receive 3,400 euros.
The distribution of votes that we have assumed is, of course, somewhat uncer-
tain, as is the assumed eligibility for Cohesion Fund support. We have assumed
that all countries except Cyprus qualify because their per capita income would
be less than 75 per cent of the EU-28 average. A less generous assignment of
Cohesion Fund status would generate substantially lower net transfers.
It is clear that accession of all the candidate countries requires substantial
changes in the EU budget. The alternatives are numerous. One is, of course, to
increase the gross contribution to allow much larger net transfers between
member states. Another alternative is to drastically reduce the amount of redis-
tribution. This must be achieved by a reduction of Structural Operations, since
they are redistributive to a greater extent than CAP financing.26
5. CONCLUSION
Joining the EU will require that Turkey attains macroeconomic stability, adopts
the CAP, and liberalises its services and also its network industries. Integration
will be beneficial for Turkey as it will remove the distortions in the price system,
boosting the allocative efficiency in the economy, which in turn will make
the country a better place to invest. Furthermore, with accession Turkey will
be eligible for EU structural funds. The increase in infrastructural investments
will contribute to economic growth in Turkey. In addition, Turkey will reap
benefits from monetary integration, and finally, Turkey will benefit from migra-
tion of Turkish labour to the EU. However, the welfare gains that will be derived
by Turkey from integration will have a price. The price will be the adjustment
costs associated with the attainment of macroeconomic stability, adoption of
CAP, liberalisation of services and network industries, and complying with EU
environmental directives.27
According to European Commission (2001), 59 per cent of the Turkish popu-
lation supports EU membership and 68 per cent of the population declares that
it would support the country’s membership to the EU if a referendum were to be
26 Here we should note that the above calculations are rather optimistic as, according to current EU
rules, transfers from the structural funds and cohesion fund cannot exceed 4 per cent of the
recipient country’s GDP. Thus this requirement will place an upper bound on the amount that
Turkey can receive from the EU under structural and cohesion funds, as long as the rules on
structural funds and cohesion fund are not changed.
27 For a discussion of environmental issues see Markandya (2003).
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held on this issue. This high percentage of support for EU membership could
partially be explained by the economic benefits that Turkey expects to derive
from membership. Equally important is the recognition in Turkey that the system
of governance of a rule-based society, as in the EU with its institutions, may
provide a better system for meeting the demands of various groups in the society.28
Furthermore, the support for EU membership stems also from the process of
Westernisation and geo-strategic considerations.29
The Turkish accession will also affect the welfare of current members of
the EU. With Turkish accession current members will derive welfare gains from
standard comparative advantage sources and also from growth effects of integra-
tion. Furthermore, migration of Turkish labour to the EU will affect the welfare
level in member countries. The empirical research on the economic effects of
immigration indicates fairly small and on the whole positive affects; employment
opportunities are not affected much, the wage of low skilled labour is depressed
somewhat but that of skilled labour is raised, and the net present value of public
transfers is positive.30 In addition to these effects, the EU will have to incur the
net annual budgetary cost of Turkish membership to the EU. Estimates indicate
that this cost will be quite high unless the rules on CAP and structural funds are
changed over the next few years. There will also be political gains for the EU.
Turkey is a large and fast expanding market. It is in fact the largest market in
the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus. According to the World Bank, Turkish
28 This may explain the support provided to EU membership by followers of the Islamist political
parties as well as by representatives of different minority groups.
29 During the Tanzimat period (1839–1877) Westernising reforms were responsible for the adop-
tion of a series of Western law codes, judicial organisation with secular law courts, introduction of
French-style provincial administration (1864), and for the so-called millet system, which made it
possible for the Christian minorities to have their own religious autonomous administration with
representative councils. These liberal reforms culminated in the declaration of a constitution and
the convocation of a parliament in 1876–1877. The process of reforms continued after the national
War of Independence of 1919–1923. Under Atatürk’s leadership, the newly founded Republic of
Turkey carried through an extensive and comprehensive programme of modernisation and secu-
larisation. Atatürk considered the total Westernisation of the country as an absolute precondition
for Turkey’s becoming a member of the Western family of nations. He succeeded in forging a
modern nation out of a failing empire and a traditional community, based on the model of the
Western countries. Turkey’s aspiration to membership in the EU stems from the process of mod-
ernisation and Westernisation, the roots of which may be traced to Atatürk’s reforms designed to
establish a secular order in a country with a predominantly Muslim population. The Turkish elite
considers membership in the EU a natural, desirable and inevitable step of this process. Further-
more, Turkey realises that it sits strategically at the edge of three regions of conflict – the Balkans,
the Middle East and the Caucasus. Given the complexity of its security, Turkey seeks to cultivate
stability in order to minimise the potential for conflict. For Turkey, EU membership can help to
secure this stability and contain conflict, particularly in the Balkans. Furthermore, the EU and
Turkey have a mutual interest in preventing and containing any instability that could arise in the
CIS region.
30 See the studies by Zimmerman (1995), Haiskens-De New and Zimmerman (1996), Winter-
Ebmer and Zimmerman (1998), Storesletten (2000) and Bonin (2001).
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GDP is as large as 80 per cent of Russian GDP. Turkey, located at the crossroads
between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East, has the potential to act as a major
link between these markets. With harmonisation of commercial legislation, EU
companies will be able to use Turkey as a joint investment and export base for
the Middle East and Eurasia. Istanbul is emerging as transnational corporations’
headquarters for operations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The EU will derive
potential gains from increased trade in the region. Finally, Turkish membership
could help to secure stability and security in the Balkans and Caucasus. The EU
could then increase its energy security and also decrease its defence expenditures.
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